Paulo Barrozo 208 Manifold fully collapsed only under the weight of the polarization of the legal historicism and legal rationalism of the eighteenth century. Yet The Great Allianceparadigm crystalized only in the nineteenth century, and its own settlement of will, reason, and history rests on the evolutionary achievements of the previous paradigm. The Great Alliance continues to preside over the thought and experience of law today. 13 Its greatest intellectual feat was to bring together the previously polarized historicist and rationalist currents in legal thought. Its intellectual heroes were Hegel and Savigny (SAVIGNY, 1831; 1993; HEGEL, 1920). It enshrined the ideas now familiar to us: national constitutions; popular sovereignty with legally structured popular participation in law and politics; tripartite division of state powers; the availability of safe institutional channels to contest authority; 14 markets legally constituted under conceptions of free contracting, protected property, and fair transactions; of individual and collective rights as mechanisms to recognize and protect values embodied in persons and groups; and of rationally institutionalized private and public competition, cooperation and conflict. The principal mechanism ofThe Great Alliancewas a compact between not only legal rationalism and historicism but also that to whichwill – now understood fundamentally as popular will – acceded. By the end of the eighteenth century, legal rationalism and historicism were polarized more than ever before. This polarization was largely due to the reception of the French Revolution across the western hemisphere. Against this backdrop, the legal rationalism of Hegel conceptualized the historicity of law as the outcome of the cunning operation of volumes 61 and 67 of the Boston Univ. Law Review in the 1980’s. Maitland saw the loss for medieval English law in escaping being taken over by the Roman law tradition more than compensated for by keeping abbey the autocratic stem that runs in that tradition as he saw it. The influence of his opinion on the matter is essential to explain the persistence of the conceptual delay I mention here. See Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I (2010). 13 I devote relatively less space to The Great Alliance as it was detailed in previous work. I also spare the reader of analysis of how the works of Savigny and Hegel cemented the paradigm for the same reason. I again refer the reader to Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law (2015). 14 The idea of institutionalized Socratic contestation, “a practice that gives institutional expression to the idea that all legitimate authority depends on being grounded in public reasons, that is, justifiable to others on grounds they might reasonably accept.” (KUMM, 2007).
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